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A study about changes and their impact on industrial safety 
Jean Christophe Le Coze 
INERIS 
Summary  
The aim of this paper is to introduce a case study aiming at better taking into account the impact of 
changes on industrial safety. It has been well documented in the past years that many accidents did 
happen because of changes, combining together technological, psychological, cognitive, 
organisational, social, cultural, political and economical dimensions, making of this issue a highly 
complex one. This case study had as a purpose to reduce the complexity of the problem by choosing a 
technologically and organisationally rather limited system, exploiting hazardous processes, where 
implications of changes could be identified and discussed with a limited number of persons. Silos, 
with risk of fires and explosions, are main installations of the seed industry and exploited by a limited 
number of persons within often medium size organisations. This was therefore a rather good case to 
start with. After that a company agreed to take part of the research, interviews with individuals and 
visit of a site was organised. Changes were identified and analysed in relation to industrial safety. 
Regulatory, organisational and technological changes were retained as significant. The interesting turn 
of this study occurred when a serious accident happened a few days before the feedback session on the 
outcomes of the study. The company asked then an investigation to be performed and this provided a 
very good opportunity to go further in the appreciation of the impact of changes in the light of the 
accident. The investigation showed that many of the changes identified in the first part of the study did 
play a strong part in the genesis of the accident, although they were not formulated with the level of 
details one is able to produce retrospectively with an investigation. This case study brings therefore 
very interesting empirical data to the question of whether or not one is able to anticipate incidents or 
accidents given specific technological and organisational configurations and evolutions. This approach 
of combining both perspectives (a study of changes in normal operation and an accident investigation 
for the same case) also brings diachronic considerations to the mainly synchronic approach explored 
so far in studies of normal operations.  
1. Introduction, the problem of change in relation with safety 
After  many incidents or accidents of the past years across high risk industries (transport, chemical, 
nuclear) , it appears that, when reading  investigations reports, changes always play an important part 
in the genesis of these events (i.e. our own investigations do show this very well too, Le Coze, 2010). 
Yet the problem of change is quite complicated because it includes a wide range of issues, better 
identified in favour of hindsight. It is indeed much more difficult to predict beforehand these changes 
that will combine together to lead to a specific unexpected accident scenario.  Several problems can be 
related to this difficulty, problems that one finds when dealing with any complex systems linking 
technological, psychological, cognitive, social, cultural, economical and political dimensions together 
(Le Coze, 2008a). One of them is that changes are permanent. Changes happen all the time. But their 
effects are not always immediate. They might need for instance to be associated with other changes to 
generate an adverse outcome. Another problem is that there is not necessarily proportionality between 
the magnitude of a change and its effects. A last one that is mentioned here is that one change 
somewhere might have some effects somewhere else.  
Organisations that need to ensure safety to employees and to external parties due to hazardous 
processes must, in their daily management, integrate this issue. Very often, one of the items of formal 
safety management system (sms) is therefore dedicated to it („management of change‟). However, it is 
also known from accident investigations or studies of normal operations, at least in the chemical 
industry where the author is knowledgeable, that beyond technological modifications, little is done 
formally to tackle other type of internal or external transformations (social, cultural, economical, and 
political) on safety. Little is done as well with regards to the effects of technology on other aspects 
than technology itself (i.e. ergonomics or team coordination). One reason is that there is a lack of 
methodologies in this area but also because there isn‟t really any clear typology of changes available 
and their link to safety.  
2. Designing a case study to approach changes 
In order to approach this problem in a way that was manageable and not too ambitious given the 
complexity of the topic, a study has been designed to start with, in an industry where installations are 
simple and number of employees exploiting them limited. Silos were in that respect good candidates. 
Silos are hazardous installations exploited by a small amount of people, are relatively simple 
technologically speaking and decentralised entities within bigger organisational structures, comprising 
traditional functional departments (i.e. production, maintenance, human resources, safety, quality). 
The opportunity to do so has been made possible through the health, safety and environment director 
of an organisation in charge of centralising supportive actions for several organisations of the seed 
industry, in many areas such as safety, quality, production, etc. This organisation plays a lobbying role 
in general in favour of this industry at National or European level. As I worked with him previously on 
designing policies on learning from experience, I asked him if his organisation would take part of a 
project on changes sponsored by the ministry. He thought the subject to be very relevant as the 
companies he works for all evolve continually and, according to him, even more so in the past years. 
One issue is definitely for them to better anticipate potential safety problems as a result of these 
evolutions. I explained to him that I needed access to voluntary companies willing to ask themselves 
questions and to be open enough to be perhaps challenged about their own practices in this respect. I 
agreed to present the project in a few hours to any interested companies he could gather through its 
network of members. We agreed on a date and about ten persons participated (I don‟t know the 
number invited initially and the proportion who responded positively, but this was a good enough 
figure) to a common presentation about the purpose and implications of the study.  
2.1. Finding an interested organisation 
To sensitise the audience, the presentation relied on some of the results of the investigation of the BP 
Texas City accident, mainly from an organisational point of view, and ended up with identifying some 
of the key changes found in the analysis (i.e. decentralising of safety function, high turnover of 
managers, poor design and aging of some installations, see Le Coze, 2008b for some discussions of 
these findings), and their impact on safety. It then introduced the steps likely to be followed for the 
study (individuals to be interviewed, observations needed, documents required). The meeting was 
good and individuals, for the most part of them health, safety and environment managers, were really 
keen on openly debating these issues referring to their own experiences and current situations within 
their organisations. They could refer easily to some of the findings of the BP Texas City investigation. 
Many even said that it would be relevant to introduce these results to their top managers, because as 
hse managers, they often couldn‟t make anything about organisational changes that were not their 
decisions but sometimes strategic decisions of executives. One person showed a lot of interest in 
applying this kind of approach in her organisation. Following the session this person was the quickest 
to contact me and to create the opportunity for being part of the project.  She had first to convince her 
boss but thought that she could do this quickly, and so I had the case that I was looking for. As it will 
be shown, it turned out that this person had already some ideas in the back of her mind when creating 
this opportunity. It is assumed now that she could see in the presentation of BP Texas City accident 
investigation some of the problems of her company in a rather accurate way.   
2.2. The ‘turn’ of the study 
I performed interviews during three days between October and November 2009, then organised the 
feedback session for the end of February 2010. One very interesting aspects, and somehow quite 
unlikely, of this study is that some of my initial outcomes about changes and their potential impacts on 
safety anticipated an accident, a fire due to self-combustion of colza (a specific kind of seeds) of 
several cells in a silo, which happened only a few days before my planned feedback session in 
February 2010. This accident represented a costly event for the organisation, damaging silos 
infrastructure and destroying seeds, although there was no harm to any employees. It was publicised in 
the local news because of its spectacular effects (flames and smoke) but also because of the 
intervention of firemen. The image of the organisation also suffered within the profession, when for 
years it had been seen as an example to follow. One immediate conclusion about the origin of the 
events was that temperatures monitoring of seeds in the cells of the silos, an operation carried on site 
by operators and considered as a basic practice, was not performed according to standards. Self-
combustion of products is one of the risks of the activity and checking temperatures (about twice a 
week) is as much a requirement for quality of product as a safety parameter (more about this latter). 
Above a certain temperature threshold, the likelihood for a fire is very high.  
The feedback session in February (only a few days after this accident) happened without much 
debating whereas I expected conflictual interpretations over some of the findings that questioned, for 
example, strategic decisions of top managers about changing the structure of the organisation and its 
impact on safety practices.  I started again this session with BP Texas City presentation to indicate 
why and what I was looking for, and then moved on with my findings. As mentioned, there was 
almost no opposition from the members of the organisation attending (managing director, human 
resources manager, maintenance manager, safety manager and operational managers), but a sense of 
general approval instead about my attempts to elaborate on the links between changes and level of 
safety. They, in fact, at that moment, could easily project themselves in what they then already knew 
about the recent accident, and these relationships that I was trying to establish. The managing director 
intervened once or twice to approve problems of information flow between silos operations and top 
management. Given the implication of the results, the hseq manager asked me to proceed with an 
investigation of their accident, with a specific focus on the organisational dimensions. She convinced 
the managing director again of the interest of doing so, and he then participated quite openly as much 
as he did for the first part of the study.  
This situation transformed the initial approach on changes in a rather unique opportunity to compare 
what I was able to foresee, and what I had missed, in hindsight. This study became also therefore a 
very relevant input to the debate about the possibility or not to infer from the state of a system (i.e. 
from a specific technological and organisational design), the likelihood of an incident or an accident. It 
gave the possibility to deploy an approach (as experienced and described elsewhere Le Coze, Dupré, 
2006) that can be seen as a way to move beyond the NA and HRO dead end, by combining within a 
same case study (figure 1, from Le Coze, Dupré, 2008), an approach of normal operations (“what’s 
happening when nothing’s happening?”, the left part of figure 1) with an approach of investigating 
incident or accident (getting into the „darkside of organisation‟, Vaughan, 1999).  
 
Figure 1.  Combining study of normal operation (targeting changes) with investigating 
incidents/accidents (in relation to changes) 
The second phase of this study (the right part of figure 1), investigating the accident, was pursued 
between March and April 2010, and results were presented in the beginning of June 2010. The 
presentation went well, although given this time to a much more restricted audience (managing 
director, hseq manager and human resources manager). Apart from few problems with some wordings, 
they accepted the interpretations and conclusions, although these were debated and that it remains, as 
always, a bit unclear what has filtered and has been retained by the different persons. Some indications 
for strengthening their current safety management and strategy were discussed, and could be 
developed in the months to come.  
3. Methodological approach 
Methodologically, the first part of the study consisted in visiting and interviewing, within a three days 
period, people operating a silo, chosen for its importance (three persons working full time) and key 
people of the organisation (six persons from various departments: human resources, safety, 
maintenance) including the managing director. The angle followed was to question all the interviewees 
about the changes that they could think of in the past, present (and  in the future, as expectations may 
have an influence on the present) in relation with their work, without restrictions and without imposing 
a specific typology to them. According to positions and experience, it was expected to hear about 
different type of changes. The study confirmed this assumption. The next phase consisted in extracting 
changes more likely to raise safety issues, but also to specify, in general or more precise terms, how. 
This requires defining the underlying model(s) directing choices of relevant changes. Such an effort 
has been done elsewhere (Le Coze, submitted), but has also limits given that expertise always contains 
implicit dimensions, such as intuition (Klein, 2004). It can‟t be fully developed here for lack of space 
and is only described very briefly.  
In this model, safety is understood as a dynamical property1 obtained by the systemic articulation of 
environmental (macro), organisational (meso) and individuals (micro) dimensions (Vaughan, 1999) . 
This property is obtained through the on-going interactions of internal and external (or collective) 
actors with technology, mediated by structure(s), culture(s) and power. Balancing conflicting goals 
(safety, production, quality, social climate, etc), defined for instance as tradeoffs quandaries (Perin, 
2005), is at the heart of this vision of safety. The power of safety department (i.e. relationship between 
this department and executives) is one of the elements of the quality of the tradeoffs operated within 
the system, but other dimensions, such as the ability to deal with controversies over technological 
problems (i.e. handling of whistle blowers) is another one. Obviously, high sensitivity to the impact of 
a wide spectrum of changes is an important factor too. Identifying changes is therefore closely related 
to the model directing choices, and therefore somehow, a test of the adequacy of the model.  
The second part of the study consisted in investigating the accident. Interviews of the same people 
were conducted again this time retrospectively in the light of the events, and interviews were also 
extended to other individuals in order to compare practices across territories of the company, and silos 
(twelve persons in total). Of course, persons directly involved in the accident were interviewed, 
although indirectly for two of them, out of three. Indeed, the company, before the beginning of my 
investigation, ended up firing these two, not so much because of their implications in the genesis of 
the accident, but rather because of their behaviour after the facts, especially one of them, who kept on 
taking decisions against the organisation‟s position, and compromising safety of silos while the latent 
risk of fire was still dealt with. As sanctions, they demoted them to lower positions within the 
organisation, an offer that two of them declined, and were as a consequence fired. One of these two 
intended suing the organisation through the legal institutions in charge of judging conflicts between 
employers and employees. Quite understandably, they did not wish to be part of the investigation. 
However, interviews with these two persons were in fact conducted by the hseq manager the day 
following the accident, weeks before this accident investigation. These interviews were written down 
and signed by the individuals, before that any sanctions were taken and therefore before the tensions 
and conflicts experienced afterwards. At this stage, they were open minded and not reluctant to admit 
what they considered to be mistakes on their part in retrospect but also organisational problems in the 
                                                          
1
 One could say „emergent property‟ but the current use of term reminds the early use of the expression of „safety 
culture‟ suffering from a lack of analytical clarity. It would seem, as a consequence, wiser not to use it before an 
effort has been made to define it more precisely.  
background of their mistakes. These interviews were then available and provided a lot of information 
needed for interpreting the case. The focus of interpretation was not so much on the technical side of 
the event, but rather on its organisational side, as requested by the company. Identically, underlying 
models are here very important, as for any accident investigations. This question has also been 
discussed elsewhere previously (Le Coze, 2008c). Main models behind these were borrowed both 
from the more normative tradition (i.e. Johnson, 1973) and the more descriptive one (i.e. Turner, 1978, 
Vaughan, 1996) of investigating accidents.  
4. Some features about the technico-organisational system studied 
4.1. A decentralised type of company 
The organisation which participated to the study is highly representative of this type of industry, both 
from an organisational and technological point of view. One of the core businesses of these types of 
organisations is to collect and store different kind of seeds (i.e. wheat, barley, corn, sunflower, colza) 
in silos, and then send them through either trucks, train, barge or ship. It is based on a physically 
decentralised mode of working created by the geographically dispersed situations of silos. One of the 
challenges is to plan the flows of seeds between silos for organising transport between destinations 
and type of transports (trucks, trains or barges). Covering sometimes very large territories, silos from a 
same organisation can be far apart, sometimes four to five hours away by car. This situation met in 
many of companies in this industry results from a trend of mergers of the past years, where 
cooperatives2 have started to group together to form bigger entities. Headquarters of the organisation 
involved in the study has for instance a more or less central position so that silos are all in a maximum 
range of 3 hours by car from the administrative building of the company, which obviously constraints 
the number of visit and oversight that can be performed. The very nature of this geographical situation 
of dispersion makes of this industry a good example of decentralised system. 
4.2. Industrial risks of silos 
Depending of the location of the silo and its design, different type transports are, or are not, available. 
More complicated silos are those cumulating: 
 Railway tracks allowing trains to be used for sending seeds,  
 a canal allowing the use of barges for sometimes very large quantity of products (depending 
on the depth the river) and,  
 for all of them, roads for trucks. 
They are therefore a bit more complicated technologically and require an ability to manage all the type 
of installations involved but also a higher level of activity (which is normally compensated by 
adequate staffing level). There is however very rarely a silo combining the three types of transport, 
and other features contribute to distinguish between a simple and a complicated silo, for instance: 
  the number and size of cells constituting the silos as well as their shapes,  
 the type of human machine interface and level of automation of the silo (including 
temperatures, alarms, etc) 
The organisation studied operated around 65 silos, divided in three territories or areas, with two main 
areas of about respectively 25 and 30 silos, and about the same number of employees to operate them, 
out of about 250 employees, including administrative, support and other functions or activities such as 
stores (about 50 persons). Some silos, the small ones, are left without full time operator, and the bigger 
silos require sometimes two or three persons, full time, a silo manager and silo operators. The 
exploitation department is the biggest, with a third of the total amount of people (with the maintenance 
                                                          
2
 The term “cooperative” defines the specific status of these organisations. A cooperative is owned by farmers who put 
resources together for planning, collecting, selling and distributing their crops. However, although represented by elected 
pairs who take part of an administrative committee of the company, they do not interfere directly into the management of the 
company that is left in the hands of a managing director, part of the administrative committee himself but who remains the 
formal manager of the cooperative. However, these farmers remain a strong source of power. One of the task of the managing 
director is to handle the many interfaces with the farmers, on site (farmers live around the sites all year long and have 
regularly opinions or comments about the silos exploitation), and through the administrative committee.  
department). Main industrial risks are fires and explosions. Fires can be produced by self combustion 
of seeds, and explosions can be generated by clouds of dust ignited by any sources of energy coming 
from mechanical equipments. Dust is a normal by product of loading, working or transporting grains. 
Although for years silos had not really been perceived as high risk technologies, two accidents in 
France, in 1982 (Metz, 12 casualties) and 1997 (Blaye, 11 casualties), demonstrated the potential 
severity of dust explosions within confined spaces such as silos.  
4.3. Regulatory context 
These two accidents led to new and then successively updated regulations, in 1983, then 1998, and a 
new version of the law came out in 2004, and then again in 2007 to add requirements including near 
miss management system, to be available for inspections.  Early regulations required prescriptive 
technical measures (aspiration of dust, etc) for preventing fire and explosions, whereas latest versions 
moved on to safety management principles (in line with other regulations in industrial safety), 
including: 
 producing risk analysis,  
 safety procedures to be written and available to personnel,  
 training to be ensured to personnel,  
 establishing a learning from experience process to be.  
It is however only after the Blaye‟s 1997 accident that a certain level of consciousness gained strength 
in the industry and in the control authorities, throughout specific programs of inspections targeting 
silos safety.  
5. Results 
5.1. Identifying relevant changes in foresight (1st part of the study, oct/nov 2009) 
During interviews, many changes were identified, ranging from technological to organisational but 
also environmental ones. Among all of them, four attracted my attention: new regulations leading to 
the creation of a hseq function, a new managing director designing a new organisational structure, a 
new generation of employees and some gradual and rapid technological modifications. They seemed 
to be significant for safety, either positively or negatively (which is one of the fundamental difficulties 
with changes, to distinguish or weight their value and drawbacks). They are now introduced. This 
section attempts to present the findings such as I saw them before investigating the accident. In 
hindsight, things appeared sometimes differently, for instance more radically than it seemed to be at 
first, but this will be explored in the section dedicated to the accident investigation. For each of the 
change retained, there is a conclusion about the potential im n,pact on safety associated with it.  
5.1.1. Introducing a new hseq function 
The few elements already mentioned above indicated some of the changes of the past years in the 
environment of the cooperative. During our interviews, many indeed discussed about the increase of 
regulations (and not only in industrial safety, but also for instance in product quality) and the resulting 
higher number of outside constraints and inspections throughout the years. One consecutive major 
implication of the new context after the Blaye accident in 1997 and the new regulation of 1998 was the 
recruitment of a person in charge of quality, safety and environment. Indeed, facing a more demanding 
regulatory environment, the organisation had to respond with more resources in order to cope with it. 
Recruiting someone became a pressing option whereas they had managed all these years without it. A 
woman was chosen to take on the task of implementing a quality system, then to slowly improve the 
way safety and environmental issues were managed, for aligning the organisation with the new 
external pressures. As a result, the department grew, and there are now two more persons working full 
time under the hseq manager. Describing the ups and downs of her experience as hseq manager for the 
past ten years, it appeared, while interviewing other individuals about this too, that this new function 
had to overcome many resistances from the other departments, which used to be more autonomous 
before. Introducing quality and safety across the organisation meant sharing information and 
centralising actions in order to ensure compliance with quality and safety requirements. People, 
including the hseq manager, talked nevertheless about it in the past, as if all these problems were now 
behind. Many of the identified tensions with the other managers, like the maintenance manager or 
human resources manager, were seen as things no longer significant.  
One of the key discussions and conflicts throughout the years between these managers was about the 
relevance of elaborating formal procedures to prescribe working practices (either for quality or safety). 
As many emphasised during our interviews, the work culture of silos operators had been for many 
years an oral culture with little description through written rules. This was sustained by a managing 
style based on proximity with employees, what they described as a family approach of the business. It 
was a work culture shaped by the autonomy of silos operators, a feature well understandable given the 
decentralised configuration of this kind of organisation (Antonsen, 2009, as described a similar 
situation on boats, creating strong work cultures). As most of their days are spent out of sight of 
managers, trust had become throughout the years the glue holding the system together in this 
decentralised mode of functioning. Without definition of what is expected at work (as found in modern 
quality and safety management systems), trust put in expertise and involvement of operators in their 
activities (in the past, first line managers or operators were very often local individuals that worked for 
life in the same silos, and the turnover was low), replaced the interest of having a formal approach 
where everything is specified under a quality or safety assurance principle. This was an important 
feature of the organisation for many years, and some of the top managers defended the idea that too 
much description did not serve quality or safety, as a drawback could be that operators would only 
apply rules without stepping back or thinking for themselves. Globally however, it seemed that, after 
ten years and despite tensions due to the introduction of a new and constraining function in the 
organisation (qhse), the trend was rather positive, and according to a majority of interviewees, the 
company did progress in quality and safety.  
My conclusion was also rather positive but I remained cautious whether this change could be seen as a 
fully „digested‟ one or a still potentially conflicting one. It seemed indeed that some recent event told 
by some had demonstrated enduring frictions between the hseq and some departments (especially 
maintenance and its manager).   
5.1.2. A new managing director followed by a new organisational structure 
A new managing director was appointed in 2007. The profile of this new manager was different than 
his predecessor. His experience was not in operating silos but was based and developed in another 
department of the organisation, dealing with other issues, including developing products to enhance 
quality of crops, a central department within the organisation although not as influential as the 
department of exploitation (which included silos operation and maintenance). The previous and 
experienced (in exploitation) director left the organisation in 2005 to take other functions in another 
company, after almost 25 years of acclaimed management. After an ambiguous and unsuccessful 
replacement by a manager appointed from outside who didn‟t fit the job, the current new director from 
inside the company took the position in 2007. Not long after, he designed a new organisational 
structure. Because of his lack of knowledge of silo exploitation (and following an inspection by 
control authorities identifying a regulatory non compliance in a silo, leading to a fine), he decided to 
move on with a new structure. Safety would be in the hands of operational managers with knowledge 
of silos exploitation, while he would step back and deal with strategic and managerial issues. In order 
to do so, his approach consisted in transforming the current organisation (figure 2), and moving from 
one model to another. While previously there were „silo operating managers (or operators)‟ under the 
supervision of „area managers‟ (about 7 or 8), themselves under the supervision of the „exploitation 
manager‟, he added a layer with an almost equivalent function to the ex „exploitation manager‟, but 
not completely so: the „area exploitation managers‟ (aem) function (3 of them, recruited internally). 
Under the „aem‟ function, he created a „team managers‟ (tm) then an „operating silo managers (or 
operators)‟ (osm) functions. Figure 2 illustrates also the years before 2000 when the hseq function was 
introduced. 
 Figure 2 : Moving from model 1 to model 2 
In order to ensure the efficiency of this new organisational structure, the managing director required 
from the newly appointed „aem‟ to develop auditing frameworks to be used as guiding principles for 
ensuring compliance with good practices. This type of reporting system based on auditing 
implemented by the „aem‟ themselves would allow him to maintain supervision from a centralised 
point of view, without being physically on site. It would help taking on the challenges for these 
persons appointed to these new functions. This new strategy went along a formal delegation of 
responsibility, developed in 2009, written with the help of a lawyer who advised the top manager to be 
less exposed to personal liability in case of an accident. This delegation was introduced to the selected 
„aem‟, who had to sign and agree with its terms. As the managing director told us, he expected these 
changes to increase motivation towards safety. He acknowledged the pressure that it had put on them 
with the auditing framework as much as with the legal delegation of authority but thought that it was 
for the good of the organisation. In order to ensure the configuration to work as best as expected, he 
also spent time describing job definition of the new functions created („aem‟ „tm‟). His view on this 
was that a system is full proof if resources are dedicated to define precisely „who‟s doing what‟ and 
that information about how things operate in reality is produced and made available. It is therefore 
confidently, but not without a bit of anxiety because of the mix of trust and pressure that he had to put 
in the „aem‟, that he talked about these changes that he himself introduced and designed.  
My conclusion was that these changes were major ones, with implications on real practices and safety 
that were nevertheless difficult to predict exactly. One was obviously, in theory and in line with the 
managing director strategy, that these „aem‟ would better integrate safety as they would be legally in 
charge, at least on paper. But I however identified two potential issues, first in the relationship 
between the hseq manager and the new „aem‟. While for the past ten years the hseq manager had, 
slowly and with pain, established a centralised position in the organisation, at the right of the 
managing director(s), the new configuration would be likely to create problems or/and tensions. Safety 
was to be indeed more decentralised with these three new „aem‟ positions and I wondered how safety 
decisions would be taken between the managing director, hseq manager and them. It seemed that in 
this domain, decisions would be likely to suffer some difficulties, in case of divergent opinions. Who 
would have the last word on safety topics, the hsqe manager or the new „aem‟? How would the 
managing director position himself in case of conflicts? The second point that I raised was the problem 
of the distance this new structure would create between real operations and the managing director. I 
could imagine that more difficulties would be met for the information to circulate from top to bottom. 
A known issue, as found in many accidents, is for difficulties met by managers to be discussed with 
top managers. Aem, especially with the pressure that they had from the managing director, could be in 
a position of trying to deal with their problems without revealing them in order to be seen as efficient. 
As the managing director didn‟t have much knowledge of silo operation, he wouldn‟t be in a position 
to challenger real practices when discussing them.  
 
5.1.3. A new generation of workers 
In the past three years, fifty percent of the experimented silos operators had been replaced by young 
ones. A clear impact was well explained by the maintenance manager. For his service, the increase of 
younger employees implied a higher number of interventions. Whereas in the past, maintenance 
problems were partly treated locally without informing the maintenance service, the new recruits, on 
the contrary, called now for any problems, even minor ones. They do not do anything themselves. 
Even changing a bulb is processed through a maintenance request, for many of them. This has put 
stress on the availability of the personnel of the maintenance department. Interestingly these many 
requests helped also to find out about some corrections brought to silos before, unknown to the 
maintenance service. Previous common practices of silos managers and operators in some areas 
consisted, instead of filing a request, of finding themselves solutions to their technical or maintenance 
problems. This supports well the idea that the decentralised nature of work contributed to the 
development of local practices and of a specific work culture. 
My conclusion was that this change in the maintenance regime had two faces in terms of safety. One 
positive side exists in the fact that there is a better view on the technical problems that need to be 
treated properly instead of independently with solutions that can‟t be evaluated by an adequate level of 
expertise. But, at the same time, this also means potentially that younger generation is not as 
knowledgeable about the installations as before. If they do not try to find, at least temporary solutions, 
could indeed also mean that they have less understanding of silos. One can therefore wonder in case of 
safety issues whether their knowledge would be sufficient to improvise adequate solutions preventing 
incidents. A decrease of resilience, at least from the time being, could result from a lack of technical 
expertise about the functioning of silos. Somehow, this point of view based on the inputs of the 
maintenance department can be linked with the feeling shared by many of our interviewees that new 
recruits were not as much involved as their elders, who were really dedicated to the company. From 
what I exchanged, it seemed that younger employees came to work and left when expected to leave 
(working from 9 to 5, and not more), and did not show much interest in the company or to silos. Many 
said that these could be working somewhere else, it wouldn‟t make a difference to them.  
5.1.4. Some technological evolutions 
A last category of changes that were retained concerned technology. Many different aspects of 
technological evolutions could be linked together, some more gradual, some more rapid. First the 
gradual automation of silos changed working conditions, with slowly removing operators from manual 
work and silos. The nature of the work changed due to these transformations, but was also combined 
with a higher demand of quality of the seeds. This new demand, a combination of quality and safety 
constraints (from customers and regulations), led to the introduction of many new instruments of 
analysis, requiring different competence, in line with a more and more computerised working 
environment.  Throughout the past 25-30 years, the number of employees dropped considerably 
because of these higher levels of automation allowing more to be done by less people. To these 
gradual technological changes, recent ones caught my attention: the higher level of transport capacity 
of farmers‟ truck, from seven tonnes to forty tonnes. One activity of silo exploitation consists in 
collecting crops. Farmers unload their crops in the silos, from july to september. It is the busiest period 
of the year for silos operators or managers (they employ then temporary workers in order to 
compensate with increase of workload). The rest of the year is quieter and involves different type of 
activities (cleaning of grains, control of temperature, drying the grains etc).  
One part of their job at this busy time is to organise the unloading of trucks. Farmers can at that 
moment, queue, wait for their turn. Handling of this situation is important as the pressure is at its 
highest, farmers do want to proceed as quickly as possible, and do not hesitate to try to influence the 
workers in this direction. It is indeed within these three or four weeks that farmers ensure their money 
for the year. A safety issue is to know whether this change consisted in higher chance of bypassing of 
safety rules in order to accommodate with the new situation. When it took only one minute to unload a 
truck of seven tonnes, it now takes six minutes. Queues are longer, and impatient farmers can push for 
greater speed.  
But, for the silo that I visited, this was not the only technical change involved recently. For this silo, 
barges could also be used for transport thanks to the canal nearby. Similarly, barges have considerably 
increased their capacity, from 500 to 1500 tonnes. One consequence was the need to augment the 
unloading rate capacity of the installations of the silo. However, it turned out that the project to modify 
the installations with this objective did not include any consideration of the impact of this 
technological change on the local practices of managers and operators. My conclusion was that, in 
terms of safety, there could be concerns about the cumulative effects of these many changes, more 
gradual throughout the years, but also more rapid ones. Although I couldn‟t specify exactly how and in 
what way, I expected problems to be met in the future on this specific silo if the modification was to 
be carried out without care about impacts on practices.  
5.2. A synthesis of identified changes 
One way to organise data and conclusions was to show that the changes identified as relevant to 
investigate in relation with their impact on safety could be located on a continuum including past, 
present and future (figure 3). Some changes were older than others, and the closer they were to the 
present the more difficult it was to predict how they would impact safety. My conclusion was that it 
would be very interesting to study more precisely how they might interact in the future, especially the 
change of organisation and the hseq position. But other issues such as the integration of the new 
generation in relation with the changes (gradual and more rapid) of technology could also be seen as 
interesting to explore. And overall, it would be useful to attempt to go further into the interactions of 
all these changes together. Whereas for convenience, the four categories of changes extracted were 
discriminated indeed at first, it was clear that it was an artificial view that could give the wrong 
impression of independence between them. The challenge consisted in imagining scenarios resulting 
from their combination (figure 2). For instance, would safety issues related to change of practices 
resulting from the combined effects of technological evolution and the presence of the new generation 
be adequately dealt with, given that the safety department had a different position in the system (with 
latent tensions) and that safety was in the hand of a new decentralised „aem‟ function?  
 
Figure 3. Different changes, what combination in the future? 
The accident that occurred demonstrated exactly this, namely how some of these changes (and others 
not identified in foresight) combined, towards a specific scenario.   
5.3. Investigating the accident 
As introduced earlier above, the accident, from the silo operator perspective, can be introduced as a 
lack of temperature checking, although a basic practice of silos safety and product quality. In order to 
understand why, one needs to describe the sequence of events that led to the accident (the proximate 
events) then to go back in time and within organisational dimensions to understand the remote 
conditions that made this accident possible. Some of the changes described in the first part will be met 
along the way, with some more precision due to the hindsight position.  
5.3.1. Proximate events 
 Silo operator  
Technically, the fire was caused by a self combustion of colza seeds. It appeared quite quickly while 
investigating that one of core human „sharp end‟ contribution was the lack of follow up on 
temperatures that is meant to prevent such dangerous rise. If temperatures had been followed regularly 
and communicated, the tm and aem would have intervened to stop it, by either emptying the cells of 
the silos concerned by the rise, or by using fans to cool down the seeds. However, beyond a certain 
threshold of temperature when combustion has slightly started, using air to cool down the seeds is 
doing exactly the opposite, namely increasing combustion speed and intensity. The operator in charge 
of this was a young recruit, with less than two years experience. One immediate interpretation by 
many in the organisation, especially managers, was to blame his lack of involvement and 
professionalism. It was a good example of this new generation of employees. This young recruit was 
indeed depicted as not really professional, for instance not tidying up the silo, not logging into the 
system for recording the temperatures checking, or other parameters. He was described as not really 
involved, and farmers living nearby, coming around the silo from time to time, once witnessed him 
playing with his gameboy in the office during working hours. Nevertheless, opinions were divided as 
some who knew him were saying that he worked hard when being part of a team and under the 
supervision of a manager. He was not that lazy person described now that the accident happened. 
Many stressed in this respect that the fact that he was working on his own in the silo did not help.  
But as in many accidents; it is only when mistakes are put within their context that one can understand 
them. Here again this principle applied fairly well. When questioning his working conditions, it 
appeared that he was not allocated full time on this silo, whereas in the past there was an experienced 
full time operator for the same silo. So he couldn‟t dedicate as much time to it, and didn‟t have time to 
get to know the silo very well. Looking at his working conditions, he appeared then to have a very 
disturbed schedule, making it more difficult to work as expected. One day he would be helping other 
operators at a different silo, and another day he would be at his silo. This lack of stability played a role 
in creating a degraded situation. Another issue was the problem of working the seeds. Because of the 
really good crops of the year, all cells of his silos were full, and he couldn‟t easily perform this task, as 
one needs to be able to transfer grains between cells to work on them (mainly filtering and cleaning). 
To do so they need one empty cell for the rotation. Another limiting factor was that the installations 
designed for transfer were very slow ones in this silo, and instead of taking less than a day to do one 
transfer, it took him two and half days. Given his schedule, being one day there and another 
somewhere else, this made his work rather difficult to plan and to carry out, especially as he was not 
fully trained and had to learn on his own.  
But that‟s not all. It turned out that colza is also the most difficult and most dangerous seed to store. In 
the past and as a consequence, colza was not stored in this silo, but in another one, equipped with 
automatic temperature checking and also powerful fans that cooled down well the colza, much better 
than the fans then available in the current silo where the colza was now stored. The density of the 
colza is high, and powerful fans are needed to go through the tons of seeds from the bottom to the top 
of the cells. The young operator didn‟t really know how long it took for the air to go through the seeds 
stored in the cells. In the past, the colza was also stored where an experimented silo manager was 
available. All these constraints combined together (disturbed activity, full cells due to good crops, 
slow transfer rate between cells, rather inadequate fans in comparison with other fans) revealed a 
particularly complicated context, especially for a young and inexperienced operator. An interesting 
story demonstrated his lack of awareness over colza‟s rise of temperatures. Few days before the fire, a 
farmer said that he saw at the top of two silo‟s cells (out of ten cells) that snow had melted, indicating 
high temperature inside these two cells. He informed the operator but it did not trigger any response 
from him apart from only putting the fans under the cells to cool them down (in retrospect, the fans 
must have contributed to accentuate the problem). He did not pass on the information. This clearly 
shows that he didn‟t have the expertise to understand the severity of the situation.  
Even if issues of lack of involvement, laziness and unprofessionalism could be heard and partly 
accepted as contributing factors to the absence of systematic follow up on temperatures (the operator 
did say nevertheless that he was checking them but not recording them in the system), his working 
conditions nevertheless guided the investigation towards the organisation: first for the lack of 
supervision by the tm, and secondly for the choice of the aem to store colza in this silo (not the best 
equipped for it), and allocating it, without worrying about the risks involved and consequently 
ensuring tight supervision preventing drifts, to an inexperienced operator not working full time on the 
silo.  
 Team manager  
Supervision was supposedly ensured by the new tm function. His tm was working in the silo nearby, 
about ten minutes away by car. First of all, this silo manager, in charge of one of the busiest silo of the 
company, did not have much enthusiasm for his new position, as he commented to me. He didn‟t like 
to be on the back of people, although an excellent silo operator, employed since 1982 on that very 
same silo, he didn‟t have much interest in supervising people. He had three silos to supervise but 
didn‟t have much time for them anyway given the level of activity of his own silo. He nonetheless 
knew about the problems of this young operator, he did notice his lack of recording, his poor tidying 
up of the place. He also admitted that this young operator had trouble doing his job given his level of 
expertise but also because of the feature of the installations (i.e. transfer issues). He recalled telling 
him to be careful about neglecting visual aspects such as housekeeping or recordings because he could 
suffer from it one day, following audits or incident. He therefore notified few times these problems 
orally to the aem, who, although acknowledging his comments, did not intervene with the intensity 
expected. Secondly, his relationship with the aem was not great. For him, he didn‟t see the aem often 
enough, communication was very little and from a distance, without strong presence on the field, he 
also regretted, as tm, not to be included in decisions involving strategies for organising flows of seeds 
between silos etc. Given that they know well their silos, it is best for them to be asked whether such or 
such option is more appropriate or not. That was not all. The tm complained about the fact that the 
aem decided without consulting him about where to put the silo operator in one place or the other to 
compensate for personnel variation (holidays, illness, absenteeism). We know now from the analysis 
of the sharp end of this accident that the silo operator was moving from silo to silo according to the 
varying needs. This was done while bypassing the tm. Given all these elements, the tm was far from 
being fully involved in his supervising function. The result is that the silo operator, who didn‟t see the 
temperature rise, lacked close supervision.  
 Area exploitation manager 
The last comments indicate the part played by the aem in the genesis of the accident. His mistake, as 
he admitted himself during interview with the hseq manager the day after the accident, was to maintain 
colza for too long in this silo without full time supervision, and with an inexperienced young operator. 
It is indeed out of good practice, but not impossible to manage such a situation, if close supervision is 
granted. Thus, in another part of the company‟s territory in 2004, before the new organisation of 2007, 
they had already proceeded like this, namely storing colza in a silo not dedicated and supervised by an 
inexperienced operator, for a few months. They got close to a similar scenario (the colza started to 
heat) but stopped it thanks to appropriate supervision. On commenting this previous incident, an 
interviewee explained a very interesting side of silos management. He explained that one difference 
with younger operators is that they didn‟t oppose to aem decisions (or previous „area managers‟, 
before the 2007 new structure) as older operators used to do. For example, storing colza in silo not 
very well equipped for it (in comparison with better and available silos) was not accepted by operators 
with expertise. They knew that it was difficult and more dangerous. However, according to 
interviewees, they still had to fight their case because aem would insist. Young operators nowadays 
did not resist and did not oppose as much to aem decisions.  
One wonders why the aem made this mistake. One explanation that comes to mind is that he suffered a 
blind spot, he didn‟t see the situation developing, while struggling and juggling with allocating 
personnel to silos (according to most people there was less people than in the past to operate silos, a 
statement that human resources manager did not confirm, although the figures did show it). One 
possible answer is found in his trajectory within the organisation. Recruited in 2007, he is one of the 
employees who made the best out of the reorganisation. The managing director and human resource 
manager were looking internally for profiles to take on the new aem functions. This silo operator stood 
out for his leadership qualities. While under the supervision of a silo manager, he slowly seemed to 
have taken over. He came to be informally recognised as the manager of the silo. He was selected, 
among other internal candidates, with the help of an outside human resources consulting company 
comforting them in their assessment of the potential of this employee (at least on the non technical 
side). This consulting company saw him as confident, ambitious and with good leadership skills. 
Although a big step in his professional career, this silo operator became an aem.  
One could have expected difficulties, as many commented. So far in the history of the company, only 
individuals with knowledge of silos and team management could gradually go up and take positions 
such as aem (or equivalent), and are about ten years older than the new aem when taking on this kind 
of position. Considering the huge gap between his previous function and his new one, his mistake is 
not so surprising.  Is it not a mistake of someone who is still learning? In this respect, it is relevant to 
note that no specific training was dedicated to non technical skills, either for the aem or the tm, 
although as stated by many of the interviewees, you can be good technically but bad on the non 
technical side. This is all the more important for a managing position. I compared then the „non 
technical‟ practices of the other experienced aem (elicited during his interview) with the information 
that I could gather during all the other interviews about the practices and profile of the aem who made 
the mistake (some are found in the „team manager‟ section). A strong contrast appeared (table 1). As 
this table show, the contrast helps understanding what decreases likelihood of mistakes for an aem. 
The experienced aem also added that despite offering the new aem to come and exchange on practices 
and on his difficulties from his new positions, he never heard from him.  
Table 1. Comparing style between experienced and new aem 
Style of the experienced aem  Style of the new aem involved in the accident 
Cautious   Highly confident 
Collective decision making process Individual decision making process 
Technical knowledge of silos and 
their individual specificities in his 
area 
Little knowledge of all the silos of 
the area and their specifities 
Visit of every silos regularly Selective visits of some specific 
silos instead of all 
Ensuring motivation of employees / 
Building a network of experts and 
building trust among them / 
Not being afraid to question oneself Excess of confidence in the quality of his judgments 
Accepting difficulties and being able 
to discuss them with hierarchy 
Hiding problems to keep an image 
of control in front of hierarchy 
In fact, in the light of the accident, the hseq manager revealed the many problems that she had with 
this aem since he started in his position. He would for example refuse to apply basic safety rules and 
would oppose many of her suggestions for improving safety. She gave me three concrete examples of 
procedures not really followed or argued by this aem. Although she would refer to the managing 
director about these difficulties with this aem, there was no strong action taken. While getting into the 
different interviews, the profile of the aem slowly took shape (see table 1) and did enlighten the 
context of his mistake, but then triggered also questions about the treatment of this individual by the 
organisation.  
5.3.2. Remote conditions 
The managing director summarised his interpretation of the accident as „a silo operator who doesn’t 
do his job + an aem and a tm who do not supervise him enough and control his work=a fire‟. 
Although quite right, it only covered the proximate events. What about the organisational side of this 
accident? In line with previous models established on grounded analysis of disasters (Turner, 1978, 
Vaughan, 1996, Hopkins, 2008) and previous personal experience (Le Coze, 2010), it was easy to 
show the very organisational nature of their accident. Two lines of approach showed this very well. 
The first one is the absence of treatment of signals (conveyed by the hseq manager), in favour of the 
new structure, supporting the new aem positions. The second is the absence of understanding that the 
organisation moved on to a new mode of functioning where trust did not play anymore the regulating 
role it used to fulfil in the past.  
 Missed signals 
In light of the accident, the interview with the hseq manager went further into the description of the 
tensions that were mentioned, but only lightly and as a thing of the past, in the first part of the study on 
changes. The day of the fire, the events started with outsiders (most likely neighbours of the silos) 
calling firemen because of a gas odour nearby the silos (at the time there was no one working there, 
the silo operator being somewhere else to replace someone, a frequent situation, as discussed). When 
informed about this both the hseq manager and the aem came on site to assess the situation. At that 
point their opinion differed radically about what course of action to take. They realised quickly that it 
was not gas but smoke coming from one of the cell due likely to a (beginning) self combustion of 
seeds. But while the aem suggested a conservative angle consisting in emptying the cell and to transfer 
the good seeds to other cells in order to save what could be saved, the hseq manager had a much more 
radical strategy consisting in completely emptying the cell to minimise risks. Given these two options, 
the decision had to be taken by the managing director. After hearing both positions over the phone, the 
managing director decided to follow the aem. It appeared to be a mistake afterwards as it was already 
burning to the point that it was not possible to save the seeds by extracting separately the good from 
the bad. But confronted at that moment with the uncertainty of the situation, he preferred following the 
aem rather than the hseq manager, although the most expert person on this matter.  
This exemplified the fact that for the past months, the hseq suffered from a weakened position within 
the system, and in her relationship with the managing director. With a strong personality and 
straightforward approach of problems, some did not find it easy to interact with her (and tensions of 
the past with other departments were also put partly on her personality). The new aem was one of 
them. He openly complained about her attitude to the managing director and human resources manager 
(there were written traces of these complains found in his yearly individual appraisal that I had access 
to). Confronted with tensions between the two, the managing director, given the good results obtained 
by the aem in general, favoured his judgment and position over the hseq manager. An audit, few 
weeks before the accident showed that there were problems in that very same silo (housekeeping, 
recording of temperatures checks, etc). But instead of triggering the right answer to the problem by 
ensuring for instance a closer supervision, the managing director was satisfied with emails from the 
aem stating that he was taking care of the situation, by refreshing silo operator‟s knowledge. The 
aem‟s own audit, a few weeks before, did show problems too, but it will not be followed by the 
appropriate response to the situation.   
The hseq manager could see how the aem was turning things and influenced the managing director for 
getting away with safety issues that he thought he could handle without having to be told how to do by 
the hseq manager. It worked so well, as far as threatening the hseq manager of being fired if she would 
carry on interfering with the aem and creating more constraints that needed. At this stage, it really 
became difficult for the hseq manager to impose and to convince the managing director while taking 
risks of losing her job. As she described it well, the power plays and influences around the managing 
director blinded him, who, without knowledge and experience of silo operations, found it very hard to 
assess the concrete situations for which existed conflicts between the hseq manager and aem. Looking 
back, the managing director confessed that he had been blind. His will to support the new structure 
that he created, to facilitate aem new position and to find ways of appeasing the recurrent state of 
conflict between the two managers (aem and hseq) by favouring one over the other led him to neglect 
the warnings of the hseq manager. As he revealed it after the accident, for him (and for the human 
resources manager), the accident was a huge surprise. It was like a shock that they did not appreciate 
the situation correctly, and gave their trust to the aem without acknowledging some of the issues 
pointed at by the hseq manager.  
 From one organisational model to the other, the issue of trust and control 
This failure of hearing the hseq warnings was the indication also of a lack of understanding by the 
managing director (and human resources manager) that the organisation had shifted from one model to 
another, and that the hseq function had a very strong role to play in this new model. Table 2 indicates 
the different features that can be seen as creating a rupture with the past. Putting now together many of 
the observations and data collected throughout the first part (figure 1) and second part of the study, it 
is possible to sensitise to key differences between the two models and to dig into why the second 
model failed to prevent this accident.  
Model 1 (before 2000 then gradually) Model 2 (from 2007) 
A exploitation manager with experience 
of silo operation and visiting silos 
regularly  
A new managing director without 
exploitation experience and more distant 
from silos 
 Experts workers with many years of 
experience and committed to silo 
operation and to the company 
• An gradual replacement by young 
recruits: 
• with another relationship with work, 
silos and company,  
• who need supervision and training 
• who do not oppose to aem decisions 
because of lack of expertise 
Proximity of area managers to teams 
due to small areas (less than 10 silos) 
and presence of a centralisation of 
exploitation through the exploitation 
manager.  
A wider area covered by area exploitation 
managers (between 25 and 30 silos) 
compared to previous areas after new 
structure and formal legal responsibility of 
safety 
A gradual progression through the 
organisation 
Possibility of going up quickly without 
going through all steps 
A short distance between silos and 
operations, a good flow of information  
•  Limited hierarchical chain  
•  Direction frequently on site 
A reduced information flow, a greater 
distance between silos operation and 
direction  
•  Longer hierarchical chain 
•  Less time spent on site 
No strategy of control of practices 
through audits, trust and 
professionalism as principles of 
functioning of the system  
Two different audit systems implemented 
under the supervision of the hseq manager 
and areas exploitation manager, trust and 
professionalism replaced by formal 
approaches   
A limited external regulatory pressure  
•  No exposure to oversights by 
control authorities on industrial safety 
matters 
•  A low level of external constraints 
on industrial safety compliance and 
integration in practices   
A highly regulated context   
•  Compliance with regulation 
requirements  
•  A pressure for more proceduralisation 
as a demonstration of safety  
• Frequent interaction with control 
authorities 
One question that one has when investigating such an accident is very much why for so many years 
such an event never occurred in model 1 and that it suddenly happened in model 2. The answer to this 
is the absence of understanding that the old model based on trust needed to be based on a different 
perspective. This evolution has been in fact well described by the managing director who said many 
times during interviews that „trust doesn’t exclude monitoring’. This sentence sounds right in this new 
context where audits have slowly become a core safety tool and where the external regulatory 
environment requires a formal approach of safety. But his first mistake was to put trust in an aem who 
should have been supervised and trained to learn good practices of the position (knowledge available 
in the organisation through experienced managers). If trust is a lever for managing, it can only be 
granted to experienced people, not someone that should have been seen as a beginner requiring close 
supervision. His second mistake was to pretend ensuring monitoring when audits and signals conveyed 
by hseq manager were denied and not followed up with adequate actions. The model 2 is not 
necessarily less efficient in principle than the previous one, as long as the logic of auditing and safety 
management system is fully implemented and not maintained in a „in between state‟, which was very 
much the impression that the organisation gave, to be in an intermediate regime.  
The same reasoning that the managing director applied, in retrospect, to both the tm and aem who did 
not act accordingly whereas they had information about problems with the silo operator, could be used 
at a higher organisational level. Indeed, whereas the managing director had information about 
problems with the aem (hseq manager) and audits showing problems at the silo, nothing had been 
done to act accordingly. To replace the managing director‟s summary „a silo operator that doesn’t do 
his job + an aem and a tm that do not supervise him enough and control his work=a fire‟, the 
following sentence was thus suggested „a new organisational model in place + weaknesses not 
corrected in this new model= a fire‟.  
6. Discussion  
This rather unique case study was an excellent opportunity to test the attempt to predict the likelihood 
of accident due to changes. It is very interesting to see through the investigation that many the changes 
retained in the first part of the study played a part in the genesis of the event. The most accurate 
predictions were about the difficulties of the hseq to position itself within the new structure leading to 
potential conflict in decisions, but also the fact that information would be likely to be retained at local 
levels (one of the criticism from the managing director to the team manager was to not report to him 
about the young silo operator) and not reaching the managing director. There were however 
information completely missed or unheard of during interviews, although there were clearly important 
changes.  I think for example of the fact that nobody mentioned the decrease and lack of personnel and 
the resulting constraints for the aem and the tm on work planning. Also surprising is that no one 
mentioned, especially the hseq manager, the problems met with the aem. I was surprised that the hseq 
manager did not tell me more about the difficult current situation she was in (the threat of being fired, 
the conflict with the aem), although not really a change, it was a direct outcome of the change. A last 
change that was not identified but a very important one is that young people do not oppose as much as 
experienced silo operators or managers used to.  
Perhaps that with more time, more observations and more interviews, these changes and related 
problems that were not identified in the first part would have come up. Perhaps also that it is much 
easier for interviewees to talk about some of these issues of change and their impact with the help of 
an accident in mind, as much as it is easier to reconstruct events in hindsight than in foresight for an 
investigator. Another aspect is that although I did identify some important issues beforehand through 
changes, it is only thanks to the investigation that a much clearer picture appeared about what I saw as 
constituting a shift from one model to the other (table 2). Whether spending more time observing and 
interviewing people in normal operations would have led to the same conclusion is not sure. It is like 
if this accident had stopped time and revealed that a new model failed, whereas without the accident, I 
considered only a flow of changes, instead of a shift with the past. As well explained in many writings, 
the hindsight bias is a very strong one, and things are not seen the same before and after. This applies 
to this study. This of course introduces the question of normality of accidents, one of the classic 
questions of the field since Turner (1978) and Perrow (1984) and further challenged by followers.  
In this respect, this experience is rather encouraging and does favour a more optimistic view than the 
normal accident one, at least on limited systems of this kind. This experience seems to indicate that 
looking at changes can contribute to see weaknesses and to consider a system more likely to suffer an 
accident than another system not confronted to these types of changes. This points to the interest of a 
complementary diachronic emphasis (introducing a time dimension) for studies of normal operations, 
to the mainly synchronic angle of early HRO. While at first initiated in studies of accidents (Vaughan, 
1996, Snook, 2000), this move has also started in normal operations, from a theoretical point of view 
(Shrivastava et al, 2009) and from a more empirically based perspective (Roe and Schulman, 2008). 
This paper has also attempted to show the importance of considering the interaction between a wide 
spectrum of changes, when they imply, diachronically and synchronically, a shift from one model to 
another and the ability of the organisation to learn from this shift in order to be able to adjust before 
the occurrence of bad surprises. Combining both views, bringing together synchronic and diachronic 
perspectives, is needed in order to understand and assess better dynamical safety properties.  
7. Conclusion  
This paper has introduced then discussed a study conducted in the seed industry, with the purpose of 
better anticipating impact of changes on industrial safety. Starting with an identification of what 
appeared to be the most significant changes and how they could translate into practices to challenge 
safety, it moved on to the investigation of an accident produced by the combinatory effect of some of 
these identified changes (but also others) of different kind: regulatory, social and organisational over a 
period of time (2, 3 and 10 years). The interest of the study was to show how these different evolutions 
defined a new model containing weaknesses not identified and prevented by managers and operators 
of the organisation. Two next opportunities following this study have been discussed with the 
managers of the organisation and other people from the seed industry. One would consist in helping 
the company to implement recommendations, and see how these can practically put in place within the 
organisation. Some options have already been suggested but it is not sure what will be done. Another 
one would be to compare a similar organisation of the seed industry which also evolved in the past 
years and has recently experienced several incidents for which explanations could be found in these 
evolutions.   
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